

**Subject: Notice for seeking stakeholder inputs on the DFC (Draft For Comment) of Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR) for Smart Camera**

Dear Stakeholders,

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 7 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (13 of 1885), the Central Government amended the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951 to insert Rule 528 to 537 in Part XI under the heading Testing & Certification of Telegraph. The new rules provide that every telecom equipment must undergo prior mandatory testing and certification.

2. Telecom Engineering Centre (TEC) came out with Procedure for Mandatory Testing and Certification of Telecommunication Equipment (MTCTE) in December 2017. The MTCTE document outlines the procedure to operationalise the new Rules.

3. The testing and certification described in the MTCTE procedure document requires that the equipment meets the Essential Requirements (ER). Security Requirement is part of ER for which the equipment must be tested and certified against. The responsibility for framing Security requirements and for Security testing and certification lies with National Centre for Communication Security (NCCS), a centre under Department of Telecommunications headquartered at Bengaluru.

4. Security Assurance Standards (SAS) vertical under NCCS is responsible for drafting and finalizing ITSARs for communication equipment. In this regard, an online meeting is scheduled for discussion with the stakeholders (TSPs, M2M service providers, Application service providers, Device manufacturers, OEMs, prospective labs, industry bodies, and academia) on the Draft ITSAR for **Smart Camera**. The details of the online meeting and registration link are as follows:

- Date of meeting: **To be notified soon**
- Registration link: will be shared later

The comments received from stakeholders will form the basis for discussion. Stakeholders are hereby requested to participate in the above meeting & send their suggestions/comments/inputs to the following e-mail addresses on or before **21.04.2023**

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Thanks and regards

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## Indian Telecommunication Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR)

### Smart Camera (Consumer IoT Category)



**Draft for Comments**

Release Date:

Version: 1.0.0

Enforcement Date:

Security Assurance Standards Facility  
National Centre for Communication Security  
Department of Telecommunications, Bengaluru-560027

## **About NCCS**

National Centre for Communication Security (NCCS), with headquarters at Bengaluru was set up in 2018 with the objective to establish and operationalize a framework of security testing and certification within the country. NCCS is mandated to prepare Telecom security requirements/standards called Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR) that address the country-specific security needs in the telecommunication landscape and notify the same.

## Document History

Sl. No	ITSAR Reference	Title	Remarks
1			

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## **A) Outline**

The objective of this document is to present comprehensive, country-specific security requirements for the smart camera. A smart camera is a consumer Internet of Things (IoT) device that remotely captures multimedia (such as audio, video, image, etc.), can perform intelligent analysis functions (such as movement detection), and share the information with the consumer (over mobile/web-based interface). The smart camera can be a part of a video surveillance system (VSS) that provides display and storage of the video captured by multiple remote smart cameras over a network for multiple security applications along with other functionalities such as remote control and alarm.

The specifications produced by various regional/ international standardization bodies/ organizations/associations like ISO, ETSI, NIST, IOTSF, Agelight, GSMA, ENISA, OWASP ISVS, and OWASP ASVS along with the country-specific security requirements from BIS, AIS are the basis for the baseline security requirements considered in this document. The BIS/ITU-T references made in this document imply that the respective clause has been adopted as it is or with certain modifications.

This document commences with a brief description of the smart camera architecture and its functionalities and then proceeds to address the common and entity-specific security requirements of consumer smart cameras.

## **B) Scope**

This document specifies the security requirements and gives recommendations for the consumer IoT (Internet of Things) smart camera installed for surveillance and monitoring applications in residential or office environments described as Environmental Class-I in BIS IS 16910 (Part 1/Sec 1).

This document does not cover the security requirements for the IoT Service Ecosystem, including all components that make up the core of the IoT infrastructure and Network Operators. Components in this ecosystem are, for example, services, platforms, protocols, servers, database clusters, network elements, and other technologies used to drive the internal components of any product or service.

## **C) Conventions**

1. Must or shall or required denotes the absolute requirement of a particular clause of ITSAR.
2. Must not or shall not denote absolute prohibition of a particular clause of ITSAR.
3. Should or Recommended denotes that the particular clause of ITSAR may be ignored under justifiable circumstances but after careful examination of its implications.
4. Should not or not Recommended denotes the opposite meaning of (3) above.

## Chapter 1 - Overview

### Introduction:

A smart camera is a popular alternative to the traditional digital camera that can extract specific information from the captured images or videos (Ref: ER TEC28822108). Smart cameras are widely used in a multitude of applications, including fingerprint readers, smart camera phones, human-computer interfaces, machine visions, and video surveillance. The smart cameras installed for surveillance in a home can be wired or wireless cameras. A user can access these cameras using a custom-built app on a mobile phone via two modes: connecting to the gateway via Wi-Fi or by connecting over the Internet and getting routed to the camera. The smart camera can process images and, in some cases, take action. For example, a camera deployed for home surveillance can trigger an alarm or send an email to a user when an entity is detected. Unlike traditional CCTV cameras that record continuously, smart cameras may record instances of activities when detecting any motion by in-built sensors.

### Smart Camera Architecture:

The hardware architecture of a smart camera varies based on the application domain and constraints on size, cost, and power consumption. The basic architecture of a smart camera is shown in Figure 1. A smart camera captures images using image sensors and stores them in the memory module. Also, the communication interface handles the transportation of images to another device or part(s) of the video surveillance system (VSS). The processor of a smart camera controls the device's functionality and analyzes the captured image to gather information.




Figure 1. Smart Camera Architecture (adopted from [2])

## VSS Architecture:

A VSS consists of a camera module, a gateway, and mobile devices. A camera collects video, audio, alarm signals, and other information, which can be conveyed to the gateway and transmitted, delivered, stored, or processed by the gateway. Gateway is the central controller responsible for configurations, access, authorization, maintenance, and update. It provides services to the user, such as watching videos, receiving alarms, and controlling camera functionality. Users and the camera can access the gateway with a fixed or mobile network. A typical architecture of VSS used indoors is shown in Figure 2. BIS IS 16910 (Part 1/Sec 1) identifies that a VSS for security applications has three functional blocks which portray the various parts and functions of the system. The three major functional parts are Video Environment, System Management, and System Security. System security includes system integrity and data integrity that protects the VSS from intentional and unintentional interference during normal operation. System integrity defines the physical security of all system components and control of physical and logical access to the VSS. Data integrity covers logical access to the data and prevention of loss or manipulation of the data.




Figure 2. VSS Architecture (adopted from ITU-T F.743)

## **Smart Camera Security:**

To provide sufficient security to the Smart Camera and the data, a coordinated effort from all stakeholders is essential. The scope of this document is limited to mandatory requirements and recommendations for the design and implementation of devices from Environmental Class-I (residential/office environment) with all security grades and access levels. The smart camera pertaining to Class-I (BIS IS 16910 (Part 1/Sec 1)) provides monitoring functions and solutions for homes/offices with detection needs. Also, it supports several surveillance assistant functions such as remote viewing on multiple devices, two-way real-time audio, storage methods, and human detection to help users. Security for physical and hardware, firmware and operating system, Communication, operation and maintenance, application domain, and data protection are some of the baseline security requirements.

Keeping in view of the device functionality and capabilities and referring to various standards on IoT security, specifically ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06), ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017, IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 Nov 2021 Security Assurance Framework, GSMA CLP suitable common security requirements for the smart camera are developed in this document. Also, specific security requirements are developed considering the industry specifications for the consumer smart camera.

## **Chapter 2 – Common Security Requirements**

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### **Section 1: Authentication**

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#### 1.1. Requirement:

Devices shall have authentication and authorization schemes (unique per device) based on the system-level threat models.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017, GP-TM-21]

#### 1.2. Requirement:

Authentication credentials shall be salted, hashed, and/or encrypted. Authentication credentials, including but not limited to user passwords, shall be salted, and hashed. Applies to all stored credentials to help prevent unauthorized access and brute force attacks.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017, GP-TM-24]

#### 1.3. Requirement:

The existing enterprise's authenticators and authentication mechanisms should be used by the device.

[Ref: NIST 8228 Example 11]

#### 1.4. Requirement:

Where a user can authenticate against a device, the device shall provide the user or an administrator with a simple mechanism to change the authentication value used.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.1-4]

#### 1.5. Requirement:

Authentication mechanisms shall use strong passwords or personal identification numbers (PINs) and shall consider two-factor authentication (2FA) or multi-factor authentication (MFA) like OTP-based, Biometrics, etc., on top of certificates.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-23]

#### 1.6. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that authentication credentials for users, devices, or services are not hardcoded in firmware or ecosystem applications.

[Ref: OWASP ISP 2.1.9]

#### 1.7. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking if Trusted Computing Base has been implemented, cryptographically authenticate the identity using the TCB.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.12 4.2]

#### 1.8. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall provide generally accepted username and password recovery mechanisms using multi-factor verification and authentication and shall provide notification of password and/or user ID reset or changes utilizing secure authentication and /or out-of-band notice(s).

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 15 and 17]

#### 1.9. Requirement:

Brute force attacks shall be impeded by introducing escalating delays following failed user account login attempts, and/or a maximum permissible number of consecutive failed attempts.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.13.15, 2.4.8.7, ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-25]

#### 1.10. Requirement:

The device shall have a limitation on the number of authentications attempts within a certain time interval. It shall also use increasing time intervals between attempts.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.1-5 Example 6]

#### 1.11. Requirement:

The client application shall be able to lock an account or delay additional authentication attempts after a limited number of failed authentication attempts.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.1-5 Example 7]

#### 1.12. Requirement:

The device shall authenticate each user and device attempting to logically access it.

[Ref: NIST 8228 Expectation 10]

#### 1.13. Requirement:

The entity's identity shall be authenticated before granting access if the entity is a human (e.g., PIN, password, passphrase, two-factor authentication) or system/device (e.g., API keys, certificates).

[Ref: NIST 8259 Activity 3]

#### 1.14. Requirement:

IoT devices shall provide notice and/or request user confirmation when pairing, onboarding, and/or connecting with other devices, platforms, or services.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 19]

#### 1.15. Requirement:

Mutual authentication shall be used.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 7.6]

## 1.16. Endpoint Password Management

### 1.16.1. Requirement:

Where passwords are used and, in any state, other than the factory default, all consumer IoT device passwords shall be unique per device or defined by the user. If password-less authentication is used, the same principles of uniqueness apply.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.1-1, IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.3]

### 1.16.2. Requirement:

Where pre-installed unique per-device passwords are used, these shall be generated with a mechanism that reduces the risk of automated attacks against a class or type of device.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.1-2]

### 1.16.3. Requirement:

Where a user interface password is used for login authentication, the factory issued or reset password shall randomly be unique for every device in the product family.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.3]

### 1.16.4. Requirement:

Provisioned credentials such as username for device authentication shall be unique per device.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.1.10]

### 1.16.5. Requirement:

The default passwords and even default usernames shall be changed during the initial setup, and weak, common, null, or blank passwords shall not be allowed.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-22]

### 1.16.6. Requirement:

The product shall allow the factory-issued or OEM login accounts to be disabled or erased or renamed when installed or commissioned.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.12]

1.16.7. Requirement:

The product shall support all the factory default user login passwords altered when installed or commissioned.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.13]

1.16.8. Requirement:

The default user or device credentials shall be changed by authorized administrators or end-users.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.1.8]

1.16.9. Requirement:

Multiple user accounts with varied levels of control shall be created.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Note]

1.16.10. Requirement:

The product shall not allow new and common passwords containing the user account name with which the user account is associated.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.5]

1.16.11. Requirement:

User authentication password change mechanism shall ask for the user's current password.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.1.6]

1.16.12. Requirement:

The passwords used for device authentication shall be sufficiently long, and complex and shall follow industry practices.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.1.7]

1.16.13. Requirement:

The device shall conceal password characters from the display of user credentials on login interfaces when a person enters a password for a device. The device shall disable the use of default or hardcoded passwords.

[Ref: NIST 8228 Expectation 9, IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.15]

1.16.14. Requirement:

Password reset mechanism shall be robust and does not supply an attacker with information indicating a valid account. It shall be ensured that this mechanism is not abused by an unauthorized party.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-26 and IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.14]

1.16.15. Requirement:

Device shall have thresholds and incremental delays for invalid password attempts Users.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.9]

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## **Section 2: Identity Management**

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### **2.1. Device Identification**

2.1.1. Requirement:

The device shall be uniquely identified logically and physically, only authorized entities should have access to the physical identifier, which may or may not be the same as the logical identifier.

[Ref: NIST 8259A Device Identification]

#### 2.1.2. Requirement:

The unique logical identifier shall be used for device authentication; however, an appropriate identifier should be used.

[Ref: NIST 8259A Device Identification]

#### 2.1.3. Requirement:

Hard-coded unique per device identity shall be used in a device. It shall resist tampering by means such as physical, electrical, or software.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.4.2]

#### 2.1.4. Requirement:

The device shall uniquely identify each user and device attempting to logically access it.

[Ref: NIST 8228 Expectation 8]

#### 2.1.5. Requirement:

The device manufacturer shall ensure that the exposed identity of the device shall not be linked by unauthorized actors to the end user, to ensure anonymity and compliance with relevant local data protection law.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.16.6]

#### 2.1.6. Requirement:

The Service Provider shall not have the ability to do a reverse lookup of device ownership from the device identity.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.16.3]

#### 2.1.7. Requirement:

Root of Trust-backed unique logical identity shall be used to identify them in logs of their physical chain of custody.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.4.12]

#### 2.1.8. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that all authentication pathways and identity management APIs shall implement consistent authentication security control strength, such that there are no weaker alternatives per the risk of the application.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.2.4]

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### **Section 3: Authorization and access controls**

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#### 3.1. Requirement:

It shall be ensured that IoT system accounts across users, services and devices share a common authorization framework.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.2.1]

#### 3.2. Requirement:

The application shall enforce access control rules on a trusted service layer, especially if client-side access control is present and could be bypassed.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 4.1.1]

#### 3.3. Requirement:

The access controls shall fail securely, including when an exception occurs.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 4.1.5]

#### 3.4. Requirement:

Administrative interface shall use appropriate multi-factor authentication to prevent unauthorized use.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.3.1]

#### 3.5. Requirement:

The administration interfaces shall be accessible only by authorized operators. Mutual Authentication over administration interfaces such as certificates.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.10.13]

#### 3.6. Requirement:

Directory browsing shall be disabled unless deliberately desired. Additionally, applications should not allow discovery or disclosure of file or directory metadata, such as Thumbs. db, .DS\_Store, .git or .svn folders.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 4.3.2]

#### 3.7. Requirement:

User and data attributes and policy information used by access controls shall not be manipulated by end users unless specifically authorized.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.1.2]

#### 3.8. Requirement:

Control Duties and areas of responsibility shall be segregated to reduce opportunities for unauthorized or unintentional modification or misuse of the organization's assets.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.10.1.3]

#### 3.9. Requirement:

The access control privileges shall be defined, justified, and documented.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.10]

### 3.10. Requirement:

The principle of least privilege shall exist. Users shall only be able to access functions, data files, URLs, controllers, services, and other resources, for which they possess specific authorization. This implies protection against spoofing and elevation of privilege.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 4.1.3]

### 3.11. Requirement:

The principle of least privilege shall be enforced by limiting applications and services that run as root or administrator.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.2.2]

### 3.12. Requirement:

The device shall restrict each user, device, and process to the minimum logical access privileges necessary.

[Ref: NIST 8228 Expectation12]

### 3.13. Requirement:

The product shall support access control measures to the root/highest privilege account to restrict access to sensitive information or system processes.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.9]

### 3.14. Requirement:

The product only allows controlled user account access; access using anonymous, or guest user accounts is not supported without justification.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.11]

### 3.15. Requirement:

Data integrity and confidentiality shall be enforced by access controls with a defined security policy.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017, GP-TM-29]

3.16. Requirement:

Authorized access to device debug capabilities shall be in place along with monitoring and logging such access.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.2.4]

3.17. Requirement:

The product or service shall record audio/visual/or any other data in accordance with the authorization of the user only, no passive recording without explicit authorization shall be done.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.12.14]

3.18. Requirement:

Control Media shall be disposed of securely and safely when no longer required, using formal procedures.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.10.7.2]

3.19. Requirement:

Control Procedures for the handling and storage of information shall be established to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure or misuse.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.10.7.3]

3.20. Requirement:

Control System documentation shall be protected against unauthorized access.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.10.7.4]

### 3.21. Requirement:

The OEM shall submit an undertaking to retain authorization of secure production control methods to prevent a third-party manufacturer (CEM etc.) from producing overproduction and/or unauthorized devices.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 4.14.22]

### 3.22. Requirement:

The product allows an authorized and complete factory reset of all the device's authorization information.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.16]

### 3.23. Requirement:

Verify that ownership is validated upon registration and as part of decommissioning when devices move across accounts (e.g., device reselling, leasing, and renting)

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.2.3]

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## **Section 4: Securely storing sensitive information.**

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### 4.1. Requirement:

There shall be a process for the secure provisioning of security parameters and keys that includes random and individual (unique) generation, distribution, update, revocation, and destruction.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.9.3]

### 4.2. Requirement:

Sensitive security parameters in persistent storage shall be stored securely by the device.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.4-1]

#### 4.3. Requirement:

Security parameters and passwords shall not be hard coded into source code or stored in a local file.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.5]

#### 4.4. Requirement:

For unconstrained devices, sensitive data such as private keys and certificates should be stored leveraging dedicated hardware security features.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.4]

#### 4.5. Requirement:

Sensitive information, such as personal identifiable information (PII) and credentials shall be stored securely using strong encryption to protect from data leakage and integrity checking to protect against unauthorized modification.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.3.1]

#### 4.6. Requirement:

The product shall securely store any passwords using an industry-standard cryptographic algorithm, compliant with an industry standard.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.8]

#### 4.7. Requirement:

Passwords shall be stored in a form that is resistant to offline attacks. Passwords shall be salted and hashed using an approved one-way key derivation or password hashing function. Key derivation and password hashing functions take a password, a salt, and a cost factor as inputs when generating a password hash.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 2.4.1]

#### 4.8. Requirement:

Salt shall be at least 32 bits in length and be chosen arbitrarily to minimize salt value collisions among stored hashes. For each credential, a unique salt value and the resulting hash shall be stored.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 2.4.2]

#### 4.9. Requirement:

If PBKDF2 is used, then the iteration count shall be as large as verification server performance will allow, typically at least 100,000 iterations.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 2.4.3]

#### 4.10. Requirement:

If bcrypt is used, then the work factor shall be as large as the verification server performance will allow, with a minimum of 10.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 2.4.4]

#### 4.11. Requirement:

An additional iteration of a key derivation function shall be performed using a salt value that is secret and known only to the verifier. The secret salt value shall be stored separately from the hashed password.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 2.4.5]

#### 4.12. Requirement:

UICC should be used for tamper-resistant storage of sensitive data for services, including security keys controlled by the service provider.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.14 5.1-1.4]

#### 4.13. Requirement:

The unique identifier should be stored in the TCB's trust anchor.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.6]

4.14. Requirement:

Critical sections of the memory should be locked.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 5.4 /5.6/6.16]

4.15. Requirement:

Internal memory shall be used for Secrets.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 5.7/7.1]

4.16. Requirement:

Devices should be provisioned with a cryptographic root of trust that is hardware-based and immutable.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.2.6]

4.17. Requirement:

Devices shall be shipped with readily accessible physical identifiers derived from their ROT-backed IDs. This is to facilitate both tracking through the supply chain and for the user to identify the device-type/model and SKU throughout the support period.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.11]

4.18. Requirement:

Tamper resistant Trust Anchor shall be used.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.3]

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**Section 5: Make it easy for the user to delete data.**

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5.1. Requirement:

The user shall be provided with functionality such that user data can be erased from the device and associated services in a simple manner.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.11-1, 11-2]

#### 5.2. Requirement:

Clear instructions shall be provided to the users on how to delete personal data.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.11-3]

#### 5.3. Requirement:

The supplier or manufacturer of any devices and/or services shall provide information about how the device(s) removal and/or disposal or replacement shall be carried out to maintain the end user's privacy and security, including deletion of all personal information from the device and any associated services.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.12.11]

#### 5.4. Requirement:

Users shall be provided with clear confirmation that personal data has been deleted from services, devices, and applications.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.11-4]

#### 5.5. Requirement:

The user shall have the ability to perform a factory reset, including the ability to delete all user data in the event of device transfer, rental, loss, or sale to a third party.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 34]

#### 5.6. Requirement:

The device shall have the ability for the user to delete or make anonymous, personal, or sensitive data stored on company servers (other than purchase transaction history).

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 33]

#### 5.7. Requirement:

The manufacturer should minimize the data collected and retained. Stakeholders should delete raw data as soon as they have extracted the data required for their data processing. As a principle, deletion shall take place at the nearest point of data collection of raw data (e.g., on the same device after processing).

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017, GP-TM-12]

#### 5.8. Requirement:

An end-of-life disposal process shall be provided to ensure that retired devices are permanently disconnected from their cloud services and that any confidential user data is securely erased from both the device and the cloud services.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.24]

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## **Section 6: Data Protection**

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### **6.1. Consumer Intimation Policy**

#### 6.1.1. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall provide consumers with clear and transparent information about what personal data is processed, how it is being used, by whom, and for what purposes, for each device and service. This also applies to third parties that can be involved, including advertisers.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 6-1]

#### 6.1.2. Requirement:

Provide a Short Contextual Privacy Notice at the point at which an individual is asked to use personal data attributes for the purposes of the IoT service, and that notifies the user of:

- identity of controller
- data to be processed
- data uses (unless obvious from context)
- how to contact the controller, especially regarding how to exercise privacy rights.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR1.1]

#### 6.1.3. Requirement:

The product or service shall only record audio/visual/or any other data in accordance with the authorization of the user (e.g., no passive recording without explicit authorization).

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.14]

#### 6.1.4. Requirement:

Manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that data processed by a third party shall be protected by a data processing agreement.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-OP-12]

#### 6.1.5. Requirement:

The Product Manufacturer or Service Provider shall ensure that a detailed data retention policy is in place and documented for users. The same shall be disclosed to users.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.12.5]

#### 6.1.6. Requirement:

There shall be a method or methods for each user to check/verify what personal information is collected.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.12.7]

## **6.2. Consent Management**

#### 6.2.1. Requirement:

The users shall be provided in clear language regarding the collection and use of supplied personal information and that users have provided opt-in consent for the use of that data before it is used in any way.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.3.3]

#### 6.2.2. Requirement:

The product manufacturer shall conspicuously disclose what personally identifiable and sensitive data types and attributes are collected and how they are used. The user shall have the ability to opt-in for any other purposes.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 22]

### 6.2.3. Requirement:

The user shall be prompted to opt-in or opt out of sharing data; the benefits or consequences must be clearly and objectively explained, including any potential impact on product features or functionality.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 30]

### 6.2.4. Requirement:

If a user credential or 'identity' is used to track the profile of an individual for the purpose of gaining insights into product use and targeting of commercial products - then the consent of the user shall be mandatory.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 1.7]

### 6.2.5. Requirement:

Use clear language and text/images appropriate to the target audience and context to ensure the user understands what is being asked of them and what they agree to. The local language should also be considered.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 1.9]

### 6.2.6. Requirement:

The user shall be notified of the 'purpose' of data processing in a privacy policy.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11PDR2.4]

### 6.2.7. Requirement:

Personal data shall be collected and processed fairly and lawfully, it should never be collected and processed without the user's consent.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-10]

### 6.2.8. Requirement:

Consumers who gave consent for the processing of their personal data shall have the capability to withdraw it at any time.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 6-3]

### 6.2.9. Requirement:

The personal data shall be used for the specified purposes for which they were collected, and that any further processing of personal data is compatible and that the data subjects shall be informed.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-11]

#### 6.2.10. Requirement

Users of IoT products and services shall be able to exercise their rights to information, access, erasure, rectification, data portability, restriction of processing, and objection to processing.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-14]

#### 6.2.11. Requirement:

Consumers personal data to be shared with third parties shall require consent of the consumers, unless otherwise required and limited for the use of product features or service operations.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-13]

#### 6.2.12. Requirement:

If relying on consent, granular choices should be provided-do not bundle consent, and ensure individuals are aware of the persistence of consent and how to revoke it. Capture and retain evidence of consent revocation.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR1.3 and PDR 1.4]

#### 6.2.13. Requirement:

Evidence of consent revocation shall be captured and retained.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 1.4]

#### 6.2.14. Requirement:

People shall be allowed to choose the presentation of their identity and only require the presentation of personal identifiers where unavoidable (such as a MSISDN, or name or email address).

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 2.1]

#### 6.2.15. Requirement:

Unauthorized linking of identifiers and authentication protocols shall be prevented across different services. Limit the tracking of identifiers or user behavior to that necessary to provide or protect a service (such as authentication and authorization).

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR2.2 and PDR 2.7]

#### 6.2.16. Requirement:

Individuals shall be provided with the opportunity to determine their IoT service 'identity' and the personal data and attributes used in the creation and presentation of such identities.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 3.1]

#### 6.2.17. Requirement:

Individuals shall be provided with the means to associate, disassociate and re-assign their IoT service identities.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 3.3]

#### 6.2.18. Requirement:

6.2.19. Processing of personal data (such as it is necessary for the performance of a contract to give access to an account and data, or consent) shall be identified on a legal basis.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 1.2]

#### 6.3. Requirement:

Personal Information shall be anonymized whenever possible particularly in reports.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.6-1]

#### 6.4. Requirement:

The product or service should be made compliant with the local and/or regional Personal Information protection legislation where the product is to be sold.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.12.8]

#### 6.5. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall identify any legal obligation to provide notices in a specific language or languages.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 1.8]

#### 6.6. Requirement:

The supplier or manufacturer shall submit an undertaking on performing a privacy impact assessment (PIA) to identify Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and design approaches for safeguarding user privacy compliant with the legal requirements of the user's location. This should extend to data gathered via Web APIs from third-party platform suppliers.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.12.15]

#### 6.7. Requirement:

A control policy which is in compliance with the regulatory requirements shall be in place to manage PII.

[NIST 8228 Expectation 25]

#### 6.8. Requirement:

The legal basis shall be identified for processing special categories of personal data such as biometrics.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 1.2]

#### 6.9. Requirement:

An internal compliance programme, policies, procedures, and practices shall be established to ensure compliance and ongoing oversight and redress for the remediation of non-compliances and identified privacy risks.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 8.2]

### **6.10. Minimize the Data Collected and Retained**

#### 6.10.1. Requirement:

The application shall minimize the number of parameters in a request, such as hidden fields, cookies, and header values.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.1.3]

#### 6.10.2. Requirement:

The product or service shall store the minimum amount of Personal Information from users required for the operation of the service.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.12.1]

#### 6.10.3. Requirement:

Sensitive personal information shall be subjected to data retention classification, such that old or out-of-date data is deleted automatically, on a schedule, or as the situation requires.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.3.8]

#### 6.10.4. Requirement:

Pseudonymous identifiers must be used to the extent possible as best practice.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 4.1]

#### 6.10.5. Requirement:

Unauthorized entities shall be prevented or restricted from observing and collecting personal data and metadata relating to the use of the IoT service credentials.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 4.3]

#### 6.10.6. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall identify the minimum attributes needed to meet a specific IoT use case. This should consider the type, sensitivity and granularity of the attributes, volume, frequency of collection, and metadata generation.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 4.4]

#### 6.10.7. Requirement:

The device shall prevent unauthorized access to all sensitive data transmitted from it over networks and on its storage devices.

[Ref: NIST 8228 Expectation 21, Expectation 19]

#### 6.10.8. Requirement:

The application shall protect sensitive data from being cached in server components such as load balancers and application caches.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.1.1]

#### 6.10.9. Requirement:

All cached or temporary copies of sensitive data stored on the server shall be protected from unauthorized access or purged/invalidated after the authorized user accesses the sensitive data.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.1.2]

### **6.11. Backup and Storage**

#### 6.11.1. Requirement:

The device shall have a mechanism to support data availability through secure backups.

[Ref: NIST 8228 Expectation 20]

#### 6.11.2. Requirement:

The backups shall be stored securely to prevent data from being stolen or corrupted.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.1.6]

#### 6.11.3. Requirement:

Data stored in browser storage (such as local Storage, session Storage, Indexed DB, or cookies) shall not contain sensitive data.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.2.2]

#### 6.11.4. Requirement:

Authenticated data shall be cleared from client storage, such as the browser DOM, after the client or session is terminated.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.2.3]

#### 6.11.5. Requirement:

Users shall have method to remove or export their data on demand.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.3.2]

6.11.6. Requirement:

Sensitive information contained in memory shall be overwritten as soon as it is no longer required to mitigate memory dumping attacks, using zeroes or random data.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.3.6]

6.11.7. Requirement:

The supplier or manufacturer of any devices and/or services shall provide information about how the device removal and/or disposal or replacement shall be carried out to maintain the end user's privacy and security, including deletion of all personal information from the device and any associated services.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.3.2]

6.11.8. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall disclose if users have the right to transfer ownership of the device and the ability to export data.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 36]

## **6.12. Data Quality**

6.12.1. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall establish a system and procedural controls to verify and maintain the accuracy and reliability of personal data and attributes, along with procedural controls to capture and address data corruptions and mismatches.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 5.1, PDR 5.2]

6.12.2. Requirement:

A process shall be established (free of charge) by which users can update their information and correct any inaccuracies.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 5.3]

### 6.12.3. Requirement:

The personal information of the user shall be processed in place to validate and authorize changes.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 5.4]

## **6.13. Information Security**

### 6.13.1. Requirement:

Security measures to be adopted through the data lifecycle shall be documented.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 7.1]

### 6.13.2. Requirement:

The data shall be transferred securely between all parties involved in the verification or sharing of personal data and attributes. The security should be commensurate to the risks associated with the data types and sensitivity, the potential for harm and impact on the user if the data is compromised, and any local regulatory or legal requirements.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 7.3]

### 6.13.3. Requirement:

If third parties process the information on the controller's behalf, the controller shall ensure such 'data processors' adopt appropriate and equivalent security measures.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.11 PDR 7.5]

## **6.14. Examine system telemetry data:**

### 6.14.1. Requirement:

Subject to user permission, telemetry data from the device should be analyzed for anomalous behavior to detect malfunctioning or malicious activity.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.13.36]

### 6.14.2. Requirement:

If telemetry data is collected from consumer IoT devices and services, the processing of personal data shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the intended functionality.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 6-4]

#### 6.14.3. Requirement:

If telemetry data is collected from consumer IoT devices and services, consumers shall be provided with information on what telemetry data is collected, how it is being used, by whom, and for what purposes.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 6-5]

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## Section 7: Secure input and output handling

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### 7.1. Input-Output Data Validation

#### 7.1.1. Requirement:

Data input to applications shall be validated to ensure that this data is correct and appropriate.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.12.2.1]

#### 7.1.2. Requirement:

The device software shall validate data input via user interfaces or transferred via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) or between networks in services and devices. All data being transferred over interfaces shall be validated by checking the data type, length, format, range, authenticity, origin, and frequency where appropriate.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.13-1, IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.10.10]

#### 7.1.3. Requirement:

All inputs and outputs shall be validated using, for example, an allow list (formerly 'whitelist') containing authorized origins of data and valid attributes of such data.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.10.12, 2.4.11.9]

#### 7.1.4. Requirement:

All inputs and outputs shall be checked for validity e.g., use “Fuzzing” tests to check for acceptable responses or output for both expected (valid) and unexpected (invalid) input stimuli.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.5.23]

#### 7.1.5. Requirement:

Validation checks shall be incorporated into applications to detect any corruption of information through processing errors or deliberate acts.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.12.2.2]

#### 7.1.6. Requirement:

Embedded applications shall not be susceptible to OS command injection by performing input validation and escaping of parameters within firmware code, shell command wrappers, and scripts.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.15]

#### 7.1.7. Requirement:

Data output from an application shall be validated to ensure that the processing of stored information is correct and appropriate to the circumstances. Validate that data sent to other product components matches specified definitions of format and content.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.12.2.4, NIST Cybersecurity Whitepaper Interface Access Control 2. a]

#### 7.1.8. Requirement:

URL redirects and forwards shall only allow destinations that appear on an allow list or show a warning when redirecting to potentially untrusted content.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.5]

#### 7.1.9. Requirement:

The application shall have defenses against HTTP parameter pollution attacks, particularly if the application framework makes no distinction about the source of request parameters (GET, POST, cookies, headers, or environment variables).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.1]

#### 7.1.10. Requirement:

Mass parameter assignment attacks shall be protected by frameworks, or the application shall have countermeasures to protect against unsafe parameter assignment, such as marking fields private or similar.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.2]

#### 7.1.11. Requirement:

All input (HTML form fields, REST requests, URL parameters, HTTP headers, cookies, batch files, RSS feeds, etc.) shall be validated using positive validation (allow lists).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.3]

#### 7.1.12. Requirement:

Structured data shall be strongly typed and validated against a defined schema, including allowed characters, length, and pattern (e.g., credit card numbers, e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, or validating that two related fields are reasonable, such as checking that suburb and zip/postcode match).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.4]

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## **Section 8: Communicate Securely**

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#### 8.1. Requirement:

The device shall use best practice cryptography to communicate securely. Such cryptographic algorithms and primitives shall be updateable. Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table1 of the latest document “Cryptographic Controls for Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR)” shall only be used.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.5-2, 5.5-3, and 5.5-1]

#### 8.2. Requirement:

The web interfaces shall fully encrypt the user session, from the device to the backend services, and that they are not susceptible to XSS, CSRF, SQL injection, etc.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-52]

### 8.3. Requirement:

The confidentiality of sensitive personal data communicated between the device and associated services shall be protected, with cryptography appropriate to the properties of the technology and usage. Critical security parameters should be encrypted in transit, with such encryption appropriate to the properties of the technology, risk, and usage.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.8-2]

### 8.4. Requirement:

Any personal data communicated between the web interface/mobile app and the device shall be encrypted. Where the data includes sensitive personal data then the encryption must be appropriately secure.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.10.19 and 2.4.13.35]

### 8.5. Requirement:

Sensitive data shall be sent to the server in the HTTP message body or headers, and that query string parameters from any HTTP verb do not contain sensitive data.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.3.1]

### 8.6. Requirement:

If run as a cloud service, the cloud service UDP and TCP-based communications (such as MQTT connections) are encrypted and authenticated using the latest DTLS and TLS standard.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.14 5.1.1.4 and IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.13.23]

### 8.7. Requirement:

TLS or equivalent strong encryption and authentication shall be used regardless of the sensitivity of the data being transmitted.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-39]

#### 8.8. Requirement:

Where a product related to a webserver encrypts communications using TLS and requests a client certificate, the server(s) shall establish a connection if the client certificate and its chain of trust are valid.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.13.9]

#### 8.9. Requirement:

If TLS is used, then only strong cipher suites shall be enabled, with the strongest cipher suite set as preferred using up-to-date TLS testing tools.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.1.2]

#### 8.10. Requirement:

If TLS is used, then the device shall cryptographically verify the X.509 certificate.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.1.3]

#### 8.11. Requirement:

If TLS is used, the device's TLS implementation shall use its own certificate store, pins to the endpoint's certificate or public key, and disallows connections to endpoints with different certificates or keys, even if signed by a trusted CA.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.1.6]

#### 8.12. Requirement:

Communications protocols should be latest versions with no publicly known vulnerabilities and/or appropriate for the product. Post product launch, communications protocols shall be reviewed throughout the product life cycle against publicly known vulnerabilities and changed to the most secure versions available if appropriate.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.7.19 and 2.4.7.20]

#### 8.13. Requirement:

If client server model is used for communication, then device shall use up to date configurations to enable and set the preferred order of algorithms and ciphers used for communication, using TLS 1.2 or later.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS V9.1]

#### 8.14. Requirement:

Since industry guidelines on secure TLS, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi change frequently, Security Configuration of the communication protocol shall be periodically checked to ensure that secure communication is always present and effective.

[Ref: OWASP V4: Communication Requirements control object]

#### 8.15. Requirement:

Disable deprecated or known insecure algorithms and ciphers.

[Ref: OWASP V4 Communication requirements control objective]

#### 8.16. Requirement:

Guarantee the different security aspects -confidentiality (privacy), integrity, availability, and authenticity- of the information in transit on the networks or shall be stored in the IoT application or in the Cloud.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-38]

#### 8.17. Requirement:

Internal or external traffic must not expose the device credentials.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-40]

#### 8.18. Requirement:

Protection against replay attacks shall be built into the communication protocol.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.1.1]

#### 8.19. Requirement:

The device shall be restrictive rather than permissive in communicating.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-43]

8.20. Requirement:

The device shall not trust data received and shall always verify any interconnections. Discover, identify, and verify/authenticate the devices connected to the network before trust can be established, and preserve their integrity for reliable solutions and services.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-42]

8.21. Requirement:

The device shall make intentional connections shall be made, shall prevent unauthorized connections to it or other devices the product is connected to, at all levels of the protocols.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-44]

8.22. Requirement:

Specific ports and/or network connections for selective connectivity shall be disabled.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-45]

8.23. Requirement:

Where the application communicates with a product related remote server(s), or device, it shall be done over a secure connection.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.7.19 and 2.4.11.4]

8.24. Requirement:

Access to device functionality via a network interface in the initialized state should only be possible after authentication on that interface.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.5-4]

8.25. Requirement:

Device functionality that allows security-relevant changes in configuration via a network interface shall be accessible only after authentication. The exception is for network service protocols that are relied upon by the device and where the manufacturer cannot guarantee what configuration will be required for the device to operate.

Protocols that are an exception include ARP, DHCP, DNS, ICMP, and NTP.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.5-5]

8.26. Requirement:

End-user security and privacy alerts and communications, including but not limited to email and SMS, shall adopt authentication protocols to help prevent phishing and spoofing and maximize the integrity and privacy of such communications.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 37]

8.27. Requirement:

The device shall implement transport-level security for email notifications to ensure the privacy of the communication while in transit.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 38]

8.28. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall develop communication and alert processes to maximize user awareness of any potential security or privacy related issue, end of life notifications and possible product recalls, including in-app notifications.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 41]

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## **Section 9: Cryptography**

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9.1. Requirement:

Devices shall be built to be compatible with lightweight encryption and security techniques that can, on the one hand, be usable on resource-constrained devices, and, on the other hand, be scalable so to minimize the management effort and maximize their usability.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-36]

9.2. Requirement:

Proper and effective use of cryptography shall be ensured to protect the confidentiality, authenticity, and/or integrity of data and information (including control messages), in transit and in rest. The proper selection of standard and strong encryption algorithms and

strong keys shall be ensured, and insecure protocols shall be disabled. The robustness of the implementation shall be verified.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-34]

#### 9.3. Requirement:

Cryptographic controls shall be used in compliance with all relevant agreements, laws, and regulations. Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table1 of the latest document “Cryptographic Controls for Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR)” shall only be used.

[Ref: ISO:27001 A.15.1.6]

#### 9.4. Requirement:

A policy on the use of cryptographic controls for the protection of information shall be developed and implemented.

[Ref: ISO:27001 A.12.3.1]

#### 9.5. Requirement:

Cryptographic libraries used shall be certified to be compliant with a recognized cryptographic security standard.

[Ref: OWSAP ISVS 2.4.6]

#### 9.6. Requirement:

All the product related cryptographic functions shall have no publicly known unmitigated weaknesses in the algorithms or implementation, for example MD5 and SHA-1 are not used.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.9.5]

#### 9.7. Requirement:

All key lengths shall be sufficient for the level of assurance required.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.9.10]

#### 9.8. Requirement:

In systems with many layered sub devices, key management shall follow best practices. Cryptographic keys shall be securely managed.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.9.11]

#### 9.9. Requirement:

Secure session shall be established after each disconnected session to prevent intentional and unintentional Denial of Service (DoS).

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 9.1]

#### 9.10. Requirement:

Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) shall deal with the disclosure of cryptographic keys exchanged during the setup of communications between two Endpoints.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.18,8.10, 9.4]

#### 9.11. Requirement:

Cryptographic secrets and keys shall be unique per device.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.4.1]

#### 9.12. Requirement:

Secure sources of randomness shall be provided by the operating system and/or hardware for all security needs.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.4.3]

#### 9.13. Requirement:

In device manufacture, all asymmetric encryption private keys that are unique to each device shall be secured. They must be truly randomly internally generated or securely programmed into each device.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.9.9]

9.14. Requirement:

There shall be a process for secure provisioning of security parameters and keys that includes random and individual (unique) generation, distribution, update, revocation and destruction.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.9.3]

9.15. Requirement:

There shall be a secure method of key insertion that protects keys against copying.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.9.4]

9.16. Requirement:

The product shall store all sensitive unencrypted parameters (e.g., keys) in a secure, tamper resistant location.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.9.7]

9.17. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that the cryptographic key chain used for signing production software is different from that used for any other test, development or other software images or support requirement.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.9.8]

9.18. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that the shared libraries (e.g., Clib or Crypto libraries) that deliver network and security functionalities have been reviewed or evaluated (note that the actual review or evaluation does not have to be conducted by the manufacturer if it has been conducted by another reputable organization or government entity). Cryptography libraries should be re-reviewed for known security vulnerabilities on each update of the device.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.5.37]

9.19. Requirement:

The device shall utilize an API for the TCB.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.4]

9.20. Requirement:

Static key or personalize key shall be used with a trust anchor device specific.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.1.1,6.1.1.1,6.1.1.2]

9.21. Requirement:

All applications stored outside of a CPU's core EEPROM shall be cryptographically authenticated.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.11]

9.22. Requirement:

The device shall support secure device decommissioning and sunsetting.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 8.10]

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## **Section 10: Minimize Exposed Attack Surfaces**

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10.1. Requirement:

The hardware shall incorporate physical, electrical, and logical protection against tampering and reverse engineering to reduce the attack surface. The level of protection must be determined by the risk assessment.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.4.7 and 2.4.4.8]

10.2. Requirement:

The devices shall have tamper resistant product casting and shall be provided protection against physical decapsulation, side channel and glitching attacks.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.9 and GSMA CLP 7.3]

#### 10.3. Requirement:

Device hardware shall not unnecessarily expose physical interfaces to attack.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.6-3]

#### 10.4. Requirement:

The device shall feature only the essential physical external ports (such as USB) necessary for them to function and that the test/debug modes are secure.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-33]

#### 10.5. Requirement:

All communications port(s) which are not used as part of the product's normal operation shall not be physically accessible or shall only communicate with authorized and authenticated entities.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.4.9]

#### 10.6. Requirement:

Debugging headers shall be removed from PCBs.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.6]

#### 10.7. Requirement:

Access to debugging interfaces (e.g., JTAG, SWD) shall be disabled or protected before shipping the device. Processors may refer to this as code protection, read back protection, CodeGuard, or access port protection.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.2.4]

#### 10.8. Requirement:

Disable Debugging and Testing Technologies: The Approved Configuration of the product to be deployed shall never contain debugging, diagnostic, or testing interfaces that could be abused by an adversary. Such interfaces are:

- Command-line console interfaces
- Consoles with verbose debugging, diagnostic, or error messages
- Hardware debugging ports such as JTAG or SWD
- Network services used for debugging, diagnostics, or testing
- Administrative interfaces, such as SSH or Telnet

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 8.2]

#### 10.9. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that hardware has no unofficially documented debug features, such as special pin configurations that can enable or disable certain functionality.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.7]

#### 10.10. Requirement:

All unused network and logical interfaces shall be disabled, offering a configuration option that logically disables the interfaces.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.6-1 and NIST (8259) A]

#### 10.11. Requirement:

Only necessary ports shall be exposed and available.

[ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-50]

#### 10.12. Requirements:

In the initialized state, the network interfaces of the device shall minimize the unauthenticated disclosure of security-relevant information.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.6-2]

10.13. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall only enable software services that are used or required for the intended use or operation of the device.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.6-5]

10.14. Requirement:

Code shall be minimized to the functionality necessary for the service/device to operate.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.6-6]

10.15. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking on following secure development processes for software deployed on the device.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.6-9]

10.16. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that each application in the ecosystem shall be built using a secure and repeatable build environment.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.1]

10.17. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that GPL-based firmware has its source code published and that no sensitive or proprietary information is accidentally included in the process.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.2]

10.18. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that banned C/C++ functions (e.g., memcpy, strcpy, gets, etc.) are replaced with safe equivalents functions (e.g., Safe C, Safe Strings library).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.3]

#### 10.19. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that packages are downloaded and built from trusted sources.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.4]

#### 10.20. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that build pipelines only perform builds of source code maintained in version control systems.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.5]

#### 10.21. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that compilers, version control clients, development utilities, and software development kits are analyzed and monitored for tampering, trojans, or malicious code.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.6]

#### 10.22. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that packages are compiled with Object Size Checking (OSC) (e.g. -D\_FORTIFY\_SOURCE=2).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.7]

#### 10.23. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that packages are compiled with No eXecute (NX) or Data Execution Protection (DEP) (e.g. -z,noexecstack).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.8]

#### 10.24. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that packages are compiled with Position Independent Executable (PIE) (e.g. -fPIE).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.9]

#### 10.25. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that packages are compiled with Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) (e.g. -fstack-protector-all).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.10]

#### 10.26. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that packages are compiled with read-only relocation (RELRO) (e.g. -Wl,-z,relro).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.11]

#### 10.27. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that release builds do not contain debug code or privileged diagnostic functionality.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.12]

#### 10.28. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that debug, and release firmware shall not be signed using the same keys.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.13]

#### 10.29. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that debug information shall not contain sensitive information, such as PII, credentials or cryptographic material.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.14]

10.30. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that embedded applications are not susceptible to OS command injection by performing input validation and escaping of parameters within firmware code, shell command wrappers, and scripts.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.3.15]

10.31. Requirement:

The descriptive silkscreens shall be removed from PCBs and debug paths and traces are depopulated from production PCBs.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.10]

10.32. Requirement:

Verify that debug paths and traces are depopulated from production PCBs.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.11]

10.33. Requirement:

The manufacturer should avoid provisioning the same secret key in an entire product family, since compromising a single device would be enough to expose the rest of the product family.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November GP-TM-49]

10.34. Requirement:

Where RF communications are enabled (e.g., ZigBee, etc.) antenna power should be configured to limit the ability of mapping assets to limit attacks such as WAR-Driving.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.7.22]

10.35. Requirement:

Debug interface shall communicate only with authorized and authenticated entities on the production devices. The functionality of any interface should be minimized to its essential task

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.4.5]

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## **Section 11: Implement a means to manage report of vulnerabilities.**

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### 11.1. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall make a vulnerability disclosure policy publicly available. This policy shall include, at a minimum: contact information for the reporting of issues; and information on timelines for:

- 1) initial acknowledgement of receipt; and
- 2) status updates until the resolution of the reported issues.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.2-1]

### 11.2. Requirement:

A dedicated security email address and/or secure online page for vulnerability disclosure communications shall be provided.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.1.5 and IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.3.12]

### 11.3. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking for the vulnerability management policies and processes associated with the IoT product, including:

- i. Methods of receiving reports of vulnerabilities
- ii. Processes for recording reported vulnerabilities.
- iii. Policy for responding to reported vulnerabilities, including the process of coordinating vulnerability response activities among component suppliers and third-party vendors.
- iv. Policy for disclosing reported vulnerabilities.
- v. Processes for receiving notification from component suppliers and third-party vendors about any change in the status of their supplied components, such as the end of production, end of support, deprecated status (e.g., the product is no longer recommended for use), or known insecurities.

[Ref: NIST Cybersecurity Whitepaper g]

#### 11.4. Requirement:

Manufacturer shall submit an undertaking on Policy that has been established for interacting with both internal and third-party security researcher(s) on the products or services.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.3.5]

#### 11.5. Requirement:

The third-party policy shall be publicly available and include contact information for reporting issues and information on timelines to acknowledge and provide status updates. There shall be a point of contact for third party suppliers and open-source communities to raise security issues.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.3.5.1 and 2.4.3.21]

#### 11.6. Requirement:

As part of the Security Policy, the organization's conflict resolution process shall be developed and published for Vulnerability Disclosures.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.3.13 and 2.4.3.14]

#### 11.7. Requirement:

Security advisory notification steps shall be developed as part of the security policy.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.3.16]

#### 11.8. Requirement:

Coordinated disclosure of vulnerabilities should be there, For e.g., Bug Bounty program.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-OP-06 and GP-OP-08]

#### 11.9. Requirement:

Key security design information and risk analysis shall be retained over the whole lifecycle of the product or service.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.3.29]

#### 11.10. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking to act on the Disclosed vulnerabilities in a timely manner.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provision 5.10-1]

#### 11.11. Requirement:

Where a remote software upgrade can be supported by the device, there shall be a transparent and auditable policy with a schedule of actions of an appropriate priority, to fix any vulnerabilities in a timely manner.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.3.25]

#### 11.12. Requirement:

To ensure information security events and weaknesses associated with information systems shall be communicated in a manner allowing timely corrective action to be taken.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.13.1]

#### 11.13. Requirement:

Manufacturers shall submit an undertaking to continually monitor for, identify and rectify security vulnerabilities within the product and services they sell, produce, have produced and services they operate during the defined support period.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.2-3]

#### 11.14. Requirement:

Vulnerability reporting mechanisms and processes to track and promptly respond to external reports should be established.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 9]

#### 11.15. Requirement:

Users and relevant stakeholders should be informed when vulnerabilities affect products through established communication channels (website, e-mail, security advisory pages, changelogs, etc.).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.1.6]

#### 11.16. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking on Software Component Transparency - Develop and maintain a “bill of materials” including software, firmware, hardware, and cataloging third-party software libraries (including open-source modules and plugins) components, versioning, and published vulnerabilities. This applies to the device, mobile and cloud services and can help quickly remediate reported vulnerabilities.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 9 and OWASP ISVS 1.2.1]

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## **Section 12: Vulnerability Management**

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#### 12.1. Requirement:

Systems logging and monitoring approach shall be clearly defined.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.12 5.7]

#### 12.2. Requirement:

The device application shall provide anomaly detection and alert on abnormal numbers of requests, such as by IP, user, total per hour or day, or whatever makes sense for the application.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 8.1.4, GSMA CLP.13 6.13]

#### 12.3. Requirement:

The device shall either support the use of vulnerability scanners or provide built-in vulnerability identification and reporting capabilities.

[Ref: NIST 8228 Expectation-7]

#### 12.4. Requirement:

The manufacturer should enforce language security so that the compiler or run-time should be security hardened, where possible, to restrict the potential for a vulnerability to be abused by an adversary.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 7.10]

#### 12.5. Requirement:

The potential areas of risk that come with the use of third-party and open-source software shall be identified, and actions to mitigate such risks shall be taken.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.2.2]

#### 12.6. Requirement:

Separation of duties in the application architecture shall allow administrators to diagnose and patch the vulnerable software prior to rampant abuse of the vulnerability.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 7.9]

#### 12.7. Requirement:

The device OS shall be reviewed for known security vulnerabilities, particularly in the field of cryptography, prior to each update and after release. Cryptographic algorithms, primitives, libraries, and protocols shall be updateable to address any vulnerabilities.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.14]

#### 12.8. Requirement:

The Device shall implement a complete persistent pentesting strategy.

[Ref: GSMA CLP-13 7.11]

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## **Section 13: Incident Management**

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#### 13.1. Requirement:

The device shall log its operational and security events.

[Ref: NIST Expectation 15]

#### 13.2. Requirement:

The device shall facilitate the detection of potential incidents by internal or external controls, such as intrusion prevention systems, anti-malware utilities, and file integrity checking mechanisms.

[Ref: NIST Expectation 17]

#### 13.3. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking for information security events reported through appropriate channels as quickly as possible. To ensure information security events and weaknesses associated with information systems are communicated in a manner allowing timely corrective action to be taken.

[Ref: ISO27001 A.13.1 and A.13.1.1]

#### 13.4. Requirement:

Management responsibilities and procedures should be established to ensure a quick, effective, and orderly response to information security incidents.

[Ref: ISO27001 A.13.2.1]

#### 13.5. Requirement:

There should be mechanisms in place to enable the types, volumes, and costs of information security incidents to be quantified and monitored.

[Ref: ISO27001 A.13.2.2]

#### 13.6. Requirement:

Where a follow-up action against a person or organization after an information security incident involves legal action (either civil or criminal), evidence should be collected, retained, and presented to conform to the rules for evidence laid down in the relevant jurisdiction(s).

[Ref: ISO27001 A.13.2.3]

### 13.7. Requirement:

Procedures for analyzing and handling security incidents shall be established.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-OP-05]

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## **Section 14: Make Systems Resilient to Outages**

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### 14.1. Requirement:

The device shall maintain appropriate access control during initial connection (i.e., onboarding) and when reestablishing connectivity after disconnection or outage.

[Ref: NIST Whitepaper]

### 14.2. Requirement:

Where there is a loss of communications or availability it shall not compromise the local integrity of the device.

[Ref: IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.7.17]

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## **Section 15: Keep Software Updated**

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### 15.1. Requirement:

All software components in the devices shall be securely updateable.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.3-1]

### 15.2. Requirement:

For a device with no possibility of a software update the manufacturer shall clearly mention, the conditions for any period of replacement support. A replacement strategy shall be communicated to the user, including a schedule for when the device should be replaced or isolated.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.5.22]

#### 15.3. Requirement:

The security update policy for devices with a constrained power source shall be assessed to balance the needs of maintaining the integrity and availability of the device.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.5.23]

#### 15.4. Requirement:

Where remote update is supported, there shall be an established process/plan for validating and updating devices on an on-going or remedial basis.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.3.22]

#### 15.5. Requirement:

The device shall authenticate to the update server component prior to downloading the Update.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.4.10]

#### 15.6. Requirement:

The update shall be applied right after the authenticity of the update is validated.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.4.4]

#### 15.7. Requirement:

Automatic mechanisms should be used for software updates.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.3-4]

#### 15.8. Requirement:

If the device supports automatic updates and/or update notifications, these should be enabled in the initialized state and configurable so that the user can enable, disable, or postpone installation of security updates and/or update notifications.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.3-6]

#### 15.9. Requirement:

The device should check after initialization, and then periodically, whether security updates are available.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.3-5]

15.10. Requirement:

Security updates shall be timely, and the devices shall be updated automatically upon a pre-defined schedule.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.4.2, ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.3-8]

15.11. Requirement:

If the network peer claims to offer a firmware-update service, the TCB shall authenticate the peer as being a part of the core IoT Service Provider network before accepting firmware updates from the peer.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.1]

15.12. Requirement:

The OS shall be implemented with relevant security updates prior to release.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.1]

15.13. Requirement:

Unsigned debug pre-production firmware builds shall not be flashed onto devices.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.4.8]

15.14. Requirement:

The encrypted firmware images shall be securely decrypted on the device.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.4.9]

15.15. Requirement:

All components, including semiconductor drivers, SDKs, and modules (e.g., 5G, LTE, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, ZigBee etc.) shall be updated to provide security patches in alignment with the product's support or end-of-life policy.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.2.9]

15.16. Requirement:

The device shall verify the authenticity and integrity of software updates, this could include but not limited to cryptographic hash comparison, code signature validation, and reliance on manufacturer-provided software that automatically performs update verification and authentication.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.3-9]

15.17. Requirement:

The device shall use best practice cryptography to facilitate secure update mechanisms.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.3-7]

15.18. Requirement:

The updates shall be cryptographically signed by a trusted source and their authenticity shall be verified before execution.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.4.3]

15.19. Requirement:

Where remote software updates are supported by the device, the software images shall be digitally signed by an appropriate signing authority - e.g., manufacturer/supplier or public. The Signing Authority shall be clearly identified. Signing certificate and signing certificate chain verified by the device before the update process begins.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.5.2]

15.20. Requirement:

Where updates are delivered over a network interface, the device shall verify the authenticity and integrity of each update via a trust relationship.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.3-10]

15.21. Requirement:

Where updates are supported, the software update package has its digital signature, signing certificate and signing certificate chain verified by the device before the update process begins.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.5.3]

#### 15.22. Requirement:

The device shall notify the user when the application of a software update will disrupt the basic functioning of the device along with the approximate expected duration of downtime.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.3-12]

#### 15.23. Requirement:

Updates shall not modify user-configured preferences, security, and/or privacy settings without notifying the user.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.4.5]

#### 15.24. Requirement:

There shall be a minimum support period during which security updates will be made available to all stake holders. An end-of-life policy shall be published which explicitly states the minimum length of time for which a device will receive software updates and the reasons for the length of the support period.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.3-13 and IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.5.35]

#### 15.25. Requirement:

Packages and user space applications shall use over-the-air updates that are decoupled from firmware updates.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.4.1]

#### 15.26. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall ensure that the device software/firmware, its configuration, and its applications have the ability to update Over-The-Air (OTA), that the update server is secure, that the update file is transmitted via a secure connection.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-18]

#### 15.27. Requirement:

In the event of an update failure, the device shall revert to a backup image.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.4.7]

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## Section 16: Ensure Software Integrity

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### 16.1. Requirement:

The device shall verify its software using secure boot mechanisms.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.7-1]

### 16.2. Requirement:

Trust anchors, such as an UICC with IoT SAFE capability, should be used to authenticate not only peers during network communications, but can be augmented to store data useful for Endpoint application security.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.1]

### 16.3. Requirement:

The application shall employ integrity protections, such as code signing or sub-resource integrity. The application must not load or execute code from untrusted sources, such as loading includes modules, plugins, code, or libraries from untrusted sources or the Internet.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 10.3.2]

### 16.4. Requirement:

Code shall be cryptographically signed to ensure it has not been tampered after being signed as safe for the device and implement run-time protection and secure execution monitoring to be sure malicious attacks do not overwrite code after it is loaded.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-04]

### 16.5. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall enforce Operating System Level Security Enhancements.

[Ref: GSMA (CLP.13) 8.1]

## **16.6. Protection against malicious and mobile code:**

### **16.6.1. Requirement:**

Controls against malicious code Control Detection, prevention, and recovery controls to protect against malicious code and appropriate user awareness procedures shall be implemented.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.10.4 and ISO 27001 A.10.4.1]

### **16.6.2. Requirement:**

Controls against mobile code: Where the use of mobile code is authorized, the configuration shall ensure that the authorized mobile code operates according to a clearly defined security policy, and unauthorized mobile code shall be prevented from executing.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.10.4.2]

## **16.7. Code Integrity:**

### **16.7.1 Requirement:**

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that a code analysis tool has been used to detect potentially malicious code, such as time functions, unsafe file operations and network connections.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS V10.1 and 10.1.1]

## **16.8. Malicious Code Search:**

### **16.8.1. Requirement:**

The application source code and third-party libraries shall not contain unauthorized phone home or data collection capabilities. Where such functionality exists, the user's permission shall be obtained for it to operate before collecting any data.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 10.2.1]

### **16.9. Requirement:**

The application shall not ask for unnecessary or excessive permissions to privacy related features or sensors, such as contacts, cameras, microphones, or location.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 10.2.2]

#### 16.10. Requirement:

The application source code and third-party libraries shall not contain back doors, such as hard-coded or additional undocumented accounts or keys, code obfuscation, undocumented binary blobs, rootkits, or anti-debugging, insecure debugging features, or otherwise out of date, insecure, or hidden functionality that could be used maliciously if discovered.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 10.2.3]

#### 16.11. Requirement:

The application source code and third-party libraries shall not contain time bombs by searching for date and time related functions, malicious code, such as salami attacks, logic bypasses, logic bombs, Easter eggs, or any other potentially unwanted functionality.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 10.2.3, 10.2.5 and 10.2.6]

#### 16.12. Requirement:

Manufacturer shall share a back-up policy including details of back-up copies of information and software that are taken and tested regularly.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.10.5.1]

#### 16.13. **OS Configuration:**

##### 16.13.1. Requirement:

The operating system shall be configured according to the latest industry CIS or SCAP benchmarks (if applicable) and uses secure defaults.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 3.2.1]

##### 16.13.2. Requirement:

The device shall not make use of legacy or insecure protocols such as Telnet and FTP.1

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 3.2.3]

16.13.3. Requirement:

The OS kernel shall be up to date and shall not contain known vulnerabilities.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 3.2.4]

16.13.4. Requirement:

Persistent filesystem storage volumes shall be encrypted.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 3.2.5]

16.13.5. Requirement:

ASLR and DEP should be enables.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 3.2.7]

16.13.6. Requirement:

An Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) or similar integrity subsystem should be used and appropriately configured.

Ref: OWASP ASVS 3.2.10]

16.13.7. Requirement:

Third-party applications should be configured to execute within a containerized runtime environment (e.g., Linux containers, Docker, etc.) that is hardened to ensure proper isolation from the host operating system.

Ref: OWASP ASVS 3.2.11]

16.13.8. Requirement:

All unnecessary accounts or logins shall be disabled or eliminated from the software at the end of the software development process, e.g., development or debug accounts and tools.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.3]

16.13.9. Requirement:

Manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that files, directories, and persistent data are set to minimum access privileges required to correctly function.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.4]

16.13.10. Requirement:

All OS command line access to the most privileged accounts shall be removed from the OS.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.7]

16.13.11. Requirement:

All the product's OS kernel and services or functions shall be disabled by default unless specifically required. Essential kernel, services or functions are prevented from being called by unauthorized external product level interfaces and applications.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.8]

16.13.12. Requirement:

All the applicable security features supported by the OS shall be enabled.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.10]

16.13.13. Requirement:

The OS shall be separated from the application(s) and shall only accessible via defined secure interfaces.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.11]

16.13.14. Requirement:

The OS shall implement a separation architecture to separate trusted from untrusted applications.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.12]

16.13.15. Requirement:

The product's OS kernel shall be designed such that each component runs with the least security privilege required (e.g., a microkernel architecture), and the minimum functionality needed.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.13]

16.13.16. Requirement:

The user interface shall be protected by an automatic session idle logout timeout function.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.6.15]

16.13.17. Requirement:

If LINUX is used, processes shall be isolated using Linux kernel namespaces.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.3.1]

16.13.18. Requirement:

If LINUX is used, critical processes shall be configured to limit resources using control groups (cgroups).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.3.2]

16.13.19. Requirement:

If LINUX is used, Linux kernel capabilities shall be configured with a minimal set for processes that require elevated access.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.3.4]

16.13.20. Requirement:

If LINUX is used, SECure COMPUting (seccomp BPF) with filters shall be used and properly configured to only allow necessary system calls.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.3.5]

16.13.21. Requirement:

If LINUX is used, the use of kernel security modules such as SELinux, AppArmor, GRSEC, shall be alike.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.3.6]

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## **Section 17: Firmware and Bootloader Security**

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### 17.1. Requirement:

The devices released shall have firmware configured with secure defaults appropriate for a release build (as opposed to debug versions).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.2.3]

### 17.2. Requirement:

Device firmware images and configuration data shall be secured against unauthorized modification in manufacturing environments, including during programming. This is to prevent IP theft and reverse engineering.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.16, 2.4.14.17]

### 17.3. Requirement:

Firmware shall be stored in an encrypted volume at rest.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.1.7]

### 17.4. Requirement:

Device firmware shall be designed to isolate privileged code and data from portions of the firmware that do not need access to them, and device hardware should provide isolation concepts to prevent the unprivileged from accessing security-sensitive code.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-28]

### 17.5. Requirement:

The secure boot process shall be enabled by default, and the product's processor system shall have an irrevocable hardware secure boot process.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.4.1, 2.4.4.4]

17.6. Requirement:

The authenticity of the first stage bootloader shall be verified by a trusted component of which the configuration in read-only memory (ROM) cannot be altered (e.g., CPU Based Secure Boot/Trusted Boot with a hardware root of trust).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.1.4]

17.7. Requirement:

The authenticity of bootloader stages or application code shall get cryptographically verified before executing subsequent steps in the boot process.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.1.5]

17.8. Requirement:

The bootloader configurations shall be immutable in production releases.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.1.2]

17.9. Requirement:

The default/standard bootloader shall not be used if it allows alternative images or firmware flashing.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.17]

17.10. Requirement:

The first-stage bootloader executable image shall be locked in EEPROM and should only be updated through a secure process.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.17]

17.11. Requirement:

Boot loading should be outside of internal EEPROM.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.15]

17.12. Requirement:

Direct Memory Access (DMA) shall not possible during boot.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.1.8]

17.13. Requirement:

Bootloader stages shall not contain sensitive information (e.g., private keys or passwords logged to the console) as part of device start-up.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.1.6]

17.14. Requirement:

The bootloader shall not allow code loaded from arbitrary locations, including both local storage (e.g., SD, USB, etc.) and network locations (e.g., NFS, TFTP, etc.).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.1.1]

17.15. Requirement:

The communication interfaces such as USB, UART, and other variants shall be disabled or adequately protected during every stage of the device's boot process.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 3.1.3]

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## **Section 18: Hardware security**

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18.1. Requirement:

The product shall have hardware mechanisms to control access to memory to reduce the risk of running malicious code.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.4.18]

18.2. Requirement:

In production devices the microcontroller/ microprocessor(s) should not allow the firmware to be read out of the products non-volatile [FLASH] memory. Where a separate non-volatile memory device is used the contents shall be encrypted.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.4.13]

### 18.3. Requirement:

Impersonation of legitimate devices on the physical circuit shall be safe guarded by:

- Loading NVRAM contents into RAM
- Validating the application image loaded into RAM.
- Executing the code directly in RAM or cache the contents in RAM.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 9.3]

### 18.4. Requirement:

Inter-chip communication shall be encrypted (e.g., main board to daughter board communication).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.1.7]

### 18.5. Requirement:

A device should support Minimum Viable execution Platform (Application Roll-Back).

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.7]

### 18.6. Requirement:

Hardware that incorporates security features to strengthen the protection and integrity of the device should be used such as specialized security chips / coprocessors that integrate security at the transistor level, embedded in the processor.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline security recommendations for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-02]

### 18.7. Requirement:

The security configuration of the platform should be locked (e.g., through burning OTP fuses).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.5]

### 18.8. Requirement:

Where a production device has a CPU watchdog, it shall be enabled and shall reset the device in the event of any unauthorized attempts to pause or suspend the CPU's execution.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.4.15]

18.9. Requirement:

Cryptographic accelerator functions shall be provided by the platform, leveraging dedicated functionality in the main chip or external security chips.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.3]

18.10. Requirement:

Where the product's credential/key storage is external to its processor, the storage and processor shall be cryptographically paired to prevent the credential/key storage being used by unauthorized software.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.4.14]

18.11. Requirement:

FPGA bitstreams should be encrypted using strong, secure algorithms.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 5.1.12]

18.12. Requirement:

The device shall use a Proven Random Number Generator.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.10]

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## **Section 19: Installation and Maintenance of Device**

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19.1. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall provide users with guidance on how to securely set up their device including how to check whether the device is securely set up.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.12-2]

19.2. Requirement:

The supplier or manufacturer of any devices or services shall provide clear information about the end user's responsibilities to maintain the devices and/or services' privacy and security.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.12.12]

#### 19.3. Requirement:

Tamper Evident measures shall be used to identify any interference to the assembly to the end user.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security Assurance Framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.4.11]

#### 19.4. Requirement:

Installation and maintenance of consumer IoT shall involve minimal decisions by the user and shall follow security best practice on usability.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06) Provision 5.12-1]

#### 19.5. Requirement:

The device shall collect logs about events with security implications, such as successful and failed authentication attempts, access to debugging functionality etc.

Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.4.1]

#### 19.6. Requirement:

The collected logs shall have the adequate granularity to enable actionable insights and alerts. Logs should include, at a minimum, the type of event, timestamp, source, outcome, and identification of involved actors.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.4.2]

#### 19.7. Requirement:

The device shall be synchronized with a reliable time source, to ensure the validity of log timestamps.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.4.3]

#### 19.8. Requirement:

The collected logs shall not include sensitive information, such as PII, credentials and cryptographic keys.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.4.4]

#### 19.9. Requirement:

Verify that collected logs can be securely retrieved from the devices over an online collection, either periodically or on-demand.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.4.5]

### **19.10. Equipment security**

#### 19.10.1. Requirement:

Cabling security- Power and telecommunications cabling carrying data or supporting information services shall be protected from interception or damage.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.9.2.3]

#### 19.10.2. Requirement:

All items of equipment containing storage media shall be checked to ensure that any sensitive data and licensed software have been removed or securely overwritten prior to disposal.

[Ref: ISO A.9.2.6]

#### 19.10.3. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall provide controls and/or documentation enabling the consumer to review and revise their privacy settings and preferences.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 27]

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## **Section 20: Supply Chain**

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#### 20.1. Requirement:

It shall be ensured that the entire production test and calibration software used during manufacture is removed or secured before the product is dispatched from the factory.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.1]

#### 20.2. Requirement:

Code integrity protection mechanisms shall be enabled and locked in hardware before shipping the device to customers. For example, ensure secure boot is enabled and the boot configuration locked.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.2.7]

#### 20.3. Requirement:

All the devices shall be logged by the product manufacturer, utilizing unique tamper resistant identifiers such as serial number so that cloned or duplicated devices can be identified and either disabled or prevented from being used with the system.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.3]

#### 20.4. Requirement:

The production system for a device process shall ensure that any devices with duplicate serial numbers are not shipped and are either reprogrammed or destroyed.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.4]

#### 20.5. Requirement:

Third-party code and components shall be analyzed using static analysis tools to ensure backdoors are not introduced.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 1.2.8]

#### 20.6. Requirement:

Contracts with suppliers and third-party partners shall be used to implement Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management.

[Ref: NIST 8228 ID.SC-3]

20.7. Requirement:

Any hardware design files, software source code and final production software images with full descriptive annotations should be stored encrypted in off-site locations or by a 3rd party Escrow service.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.2]

20.8. Requirement:

In manufacture, all encryption keys that are unique to each device shall be either securely and truly randomly internally generated or securely programmed into each device in accordance with industry standard FIPS140-2 or equivalent.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.9]

20.9. Requirement:

A cryptographic protected ownership proof shall be transferred along the supply chain and extended if a new owner is added in the chain. This process shall be based on open standards such as Enhanced Privacy ID, Certificates per definition in ISO 20008/20009.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.7]

20.10. Requirement:

Procedures for proper disposal of scrap product shall exist at manufacturing facilities, and compliance shall be monitored. This to prevent scrap entering grey markets.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.14]

20.11. Requirement:

Steps shall be taken to prevent inauthentic devices from being signed into certificate chains of trust or otherwise on boarded. For example, a policy or checklist describing which devices may be on boarded exists and is followed.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.18]

20.12. Requirement:

An auditable manifest of all libraries used within the product (open source, etc.) shall be maintained to inform vulnerability management throughout the device lifecycle and whole of the support period.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.8]

20.13. Requirement:

Products shall be shipped with information (documents or URL) about their operations and normal behavior e.g., domains contacted, volume of messaging, Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD).

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.13]

## Chapter 3 – Specific Security Requirements

### 1. Requirement:

Appropriate authentication methods shall be used to control access by remote users.

[Ref: ISO 27001 A.11.4.2]

### 2. Requirement:

User authentication shall use HTTPS, TLS1.2 or better.

### 3. Requirement:

The device shall authenticate itself to connect to the VMS/cloud.

[Ref: T-REC-X.1453]

### 4. Requirement:

The device shall support 802.1x network authentication with EAP and TLS 1.2 or better.

### 5. Requirement:

The device should support Digest Authentication.

### 6. Requirement:

FAILED Authentication attempts should be logged.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.7.5]

### 7. Requirement:

Authentication schemes shall be designed to revoke credentials of compromised or decommissioned devices.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.1.11]

8. Requirement:

An acceptable password shall have minimum of 12 characters from at least three different character groups-- upper case, lower case, digits, punctuation, etc., and the password shall be changed at least once in every 90 days. Device shall have password expiration detection.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 2.1.5, Security requirements for intelligent video cameras (ITU draft)]

9. Requirement:

The devices shall be provided with a RoT-backed unique authenticable logical identity.

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.8.18]

10. Requirement:

An authorized actor in physical possession of a device should be able to discover and authenticate its ROT backed logical identity e.g., for inspection, verification of devices being on boarded (this may need electrical connection)

[Ref: IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 2.4.14.10]

11. Requirement:

Guarantee data authenticity to enable reliable exchanges from data emission to data reception. Data shall always be signed whenever and wherever it is captured and stored.

[Ref: ENISA BASELINE SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IOT NOVEMBER 2017 Baseline security recommendations GP-TM-41]

12. Requirement:

Access control shall ensure that only authorized users are allowed to access the management server according to their access privileges in the video surveillance system.

[Ref: T-REC-X.1453]

13. Requirement:

The device shall support end-to-end encrypted transmission to ensure that nobody is able to access your video data in the camera's real-time video stream.

14. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking whether the device shares the recorded video and personal data.

15. Requirement:

The manufacture shall provide list of detection and analytics functions (for example, human detection, baby crying detection etc.) that a user can enabled or disabled by default.

16. Requirement:

The manufacture shall provide list of device's functions/functionality that cannot be enabled without user's explicit consent.

17. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall share what PI device collects. The device shall ensure that all PI is encrypted only accessible after successful authentication and authorization.

[Ref: ITU-T F.743, IoT SF IoT Security assurance framework Release 3.0 November 2021 4.12.2]

18. Requirement:

The device should include a hardware-level access control mechanism for memory.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) provisions 5.6-8]

19. Requirement:

The device integrity shall ensure that the stored video data are original data without forgery.

[Ref. T-REC-X.1453]

20. Requirement:

The device integrity shall ensure that the video data transmitted from the camera are original data without forgery.

[Ref. T-REC-X.1453]

21. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall not knowingly collect or maintain information about persons under 13 years of age.

22. Requirement:

The device should have Anti-counterfeiting identification like watermark etc.

[Ref: Security requirements for intelligent video cameras (ITU draft)]

23. Requirement:

The device shall adopt secure encryption method for encrypted transmission and storage of your video via AES128 or better.

24. Requirement:

The device shall use dynamic ARP detection or transmission encryption to prevent attacker from using and analyzing network traffic.

[Ref: Security requirements for intelligent video cameras (ITU draft)]

25. Requirement:

The device should use X.509 certificates for Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).

26. Requirement:

The SSIDs should not be the default and should be hidden for all connected devices, reducing the attack surface of a brute-force attack.

[Ref: Security Considerations for Smart Cameras

<https://www.einfochips.com/blog/security-considerations-for-smart-cameras/> ]

27. Requirement:

The device shall support protocol hardening configuration.

[Ref: Security requirements for intelligent video cameras (ITU draft)]

28. Requirement:

The device shall support sFTP.

29. Requirement:

The device should support IP Filter.

30. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking on list of vulnerabilities found, repaired and remedial action taken in factory stage.

[Ref: Security requirements for intelligent video cameras (ITU draft)]

31. Requirement:

The device should conform to the ONVIF Profile S, ONVIF Profile G, ONVIF Profile M, and ONVIF Profile T specifications.

32. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall share the details of list of parameters and events that are logged and audited.

[Ref: Security requirements for intelligent video cameras (ITU draft)]

33. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall submit an undertaking that the devices' firmware should undergo rigorous auditing to check for any security bugs – in the code, data flow, various logics, and even the configurations.

[Ref: Security Considerations for Smart Cameras

<https://www.einfochips.com/blog/security-considerations-for-smart-cameras/> ]

34. Requirement:

The manufacturer should provide patches or upgrades for all software and firmware throughout each device's lifespan. Update should occur from servers within the country.

[Ref: NIST 8228 Expectation 5, NCCS]

35. Requirement:

The device shall have its own secure built-in patch, upgrade, and configuration management capabilities.

[Ref: NIST 8228 Expectation 6]

36. Requirement:

The device should have mechanisms for self-diagnosis and self-repair/healing to recover from failure, malfunction, or a compromised state.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-16]

37. Requirement:

The device should support a return to a state that was known to be secure.

[Ref: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendation for IoT November 2017 GP-TM-06]

38. Requirement:

The device should detect, identify, and prevent intrusion behaviors such as abnormal super accounts, system sensitive file tampering, process privilege escalation, etc. to ensure that system resources are protected from attacks that use an IP based network, allowing the video surveillance to operate normally.

[Ref: T-REC-X.1453]

39. Requirement:

Consumer IoT devices should remain operating and locally functional in the case of a loss of network access and should recover cleanly in the case of restoration of a loss of power.

[Ref: ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) provisions 5.9-2]

40. Requirement:

The device should have built-in Secure Element (SE) hardware providing main Trusted Platform Module (TPM) functionality to ensure the highest levels of data security and privacy protection.

41. Requirement:

A TCB (Trusted Computing Base) that implements personalization and provisioning shall ensure that the Endpoint has an identity that is cryptographically unique from every other Endpoint of its type.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 6.1]

42. Requirement:

The application shall have additional authorization (such as step up or adaptive authentication) for lower value systems, and / or segregation of duties for high value applications to enforce anti-fraud controls as per the risk of application and past fraud.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 4.3.3]

43. Requirement:

Sensitive data and APIs shall be protected against Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) attacks targeting creation, reading, updating and deletion of records, such as creating or updating someone else's record, viewing everyone's records, or deleting all records.

[Ref: OWASP ASVS 4.2.1]

44. Requirement:

Memory protection must be enabled in the underlying hardware architecture, and the operating system must have a concept of privilege levels. Unprivileged software must be

restricted from accessing privileged resources, such as drivers, configuration files, or other objects.

[Ref: GSMA CLP.13 7.9]

45. Requirement:

Management of removable media Control: There shall be procedures in place for the management of removable media.

[Ref: ISO A.10.7.1]

46. Requirement:

The device shall support alarm generation, User-definable alerts, email alerts, and HTTP notifications for camera physical tampering detection.

[Ref: Security requirements for intelligent video cameras (ITU draft)]

47. Requirement:

The manufacturer shall remove silkscreen.

[Ref: Security requirements for intelligent video cameras (ITU draft)]

48. Requirement:

The device should have an integrated Privacy Shield/ Privacy Mask to give you an extra level of privacy.

[Ref: Security requirements for intelligent video cameras (ITU draft)]

49. Requirement:

The device shall have impact protection IK08 (except lens) or more.

[Ref: [https://www.degy.com/ip\\_ik\\_rating.html](https://www.degy.com/ip_ik_rating.html) ]

50. Requirement:

The device shall have ingress protection IP66 or more.

[Ref: [https://www.deggy.com/ip\\_ik\\_rating.html](https://www.deggy.com/ip_ik_rating.html) ]

#### 51. Requirement:

Users shall manage and/or update information such as account settings, notifications, not used features and services, opt-out from email service, and refuse all or some browser cookies, or to alert you when websites set or access cookies by accessing Mobile Apps, Subscription Services, or web Apps.

### 52. Bluetooth

#### 52.1. Requirement:

Pairing and discovery shall be blocked in Bluetooth devices except when necessary.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.3.1]

#### 52.2. Requirement:

PIN or Pass-Key codes shall not be easily guessable (e.g., don't use 0000 or 1234).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.3.2]

#### 52.3. Requirement:

The devices using old versions of Bluetooth with simple modes of authentication enabled shall require a PIN for pairing.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.3.3]

#### 52.4. Requirement:

In modern versions of Bluetooth, at least 6 digits shall be required for Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) authentication under all versions except "Just Works."

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.3.4]

#### 52.5. Requirement:

Encryption keys shall be the maximum size the device supports, and this size is sufficient to adequately protect the information transmitted over the Bluetooth connection. The most secure Bluetooth pairing method available shall be used.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.3.5]

#### 52.6. Requirement:

Out Of Band (OOB), Numeric Comparison, or Passkey Entry pairing methods shall be used depending on the communicating device's capabilities.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.3.6]

#### 52.7. Requirement:

The strongest Bluetooth Security Mode and Level supported by the device shall be used. For example, for Bluetooth 4.1 devices, Security Mode 4, and Level 4 shall be used to provide authenticated pairing and encryption.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.3.7]

#### 52.8. Requirement:

Bluetooth connections should be encrypted when transmitting user IDs, passwords, and other sensitive information.

[Ref: Agelight IoT Safety Architecture & Risk Toolkit v4.0 1]

### 53. **Zigbee**

#### 53.1. Requirement:

Zigbee version 3.0 shall be used for new applications.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.5.1]

#### 53.2. Requirement:

A suitable Zigbee security architecture (Centralized or Distributed) shall select, depending on the application's security level requirements and threat model. The Centralized architecture generally offers higher security at the cost of flexibility.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.5.2]

#### 53.3. Requirement:

The most secure way of joining the Zigbee network shall be used, depending on the selected security architecture. For example, for the Centralized architecture, use out-of-band install codes. For the Distributed one, use pre-configured link keys.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.5.3]

#### 53.4. Requirement:

The default pre-configured global link key (i.e., ZigbeeAlliance09) shall not be used to join the network, except if explicitly required for compatibility reasons and if associated risks have been considered.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.5.4]

#### 53.5. Requirement:

User interaction shall be required to activate pairing mode for both the joining nodes and the Zigbee Trust Center or router. Devices should automatically exit pairing mode after a pre-defined short amount of time, even if the pairing is unsuccessful.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.5.5]

#### 53.6. Requirement:

The network key shall be randomly generated (for example during the initial network setup).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.5.6]

#### 53.7. Requirement:

The network key shall be periodically rotated.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.5.7]

#### 53.8. Requirement:

Users shall obtain an overview of paired devices to validate that they are legitimate (for example, by comparing the MAC addresses of connected devices to the expected ones).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.5.8]

### 54. Wi-Fi

#### 54.1. Requirement:

Wi-Fi connectivity shall be disabled unless required as part of device functionality. Devices with no need for network connectivity or which support other types of network connectivity, such as Ethernet, shall have the Wi-Fi interface disabled.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.4.1]

#### 54.2. Requirement:

WPA2 or higher shall be used to protect Wi-Fi communications.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.4.2]

#### 54.3. Requirement:

If WPA is used, it shall be encrypted with AES (CCMP mode).

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.4.3]

#### 54.4. Requirement:

Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) shall not use to establish Wi-Fi connections between devices.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.4.4]

### 55. LTE

#### 55.1. Requirement:

LTE shall enable Confidentiality on the Air Interface.

[Ref: NIST SP 800-187 5.2]

55.2. Requirement:

LTE shall use the Ciphering Indicator

[Ref: NIST SP 800-187 5.3]

55.3. Requirement:

The device shall have User-Defined Option for Connecting to LTE Networks

[Ref: NIST SP 800-187 5.4]

55.4. Requirement:

The device shall use SIM/USIM PIN Code

[Ref: NIST SP 800-187 5.7]

55.5. Requirement:

LTE shall use Temporary Identities

[Ref: NIST SP 800-187 5.8]

## 56. LoRaWAN

56.1. Requirement:

LoRaWAN version 1.1 shall be used by new applications.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.6.1]

56.2. Requirement:

The network, join and application servers of the LoRaWAN ecosystem shall be appropriately hardened according to industry best practices and benchmarks.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.6.2]

56.3. Requirement:

All communication between the LoRaWAN gateway and the network, join and application servers shall occur over a secure channel (for example TLS or IPsec), guaranteeing at least the integrity and authenticity of the messages.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.6.3]

56.4. Requirement:

Root keys shall be unique per end device.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.6.4]

56.5. Requirement:

Replay attacks shall not be possible using off-sequence frame counters. For example, in case end device counters are reset after a reboot, verify that old messages cannot be replayed to the gateway.

[Ref: OWASP ISVS 4.6.5]

## 57. Regulatory provisions

57.1. Requirement:

Private (secure) APN shall be used to connect cellular network.

57.2. Requirement:

M2M Service Providers (M2MSP) & WPAN/WLAN Connectivity Provider for M2M services shall be registered as per DoT guidelines issued.

57.3. Requirement:

It shall be possible to register the device, services etc., with the proposed National Trust Centre (NTC).

[Ref: TEC-TR-SN-M2M-009-01]

57.4. Requirement:

The SIM card used in the Feedback device shall meet the security requirements as specified in the ITSAR on “Pluggable (U)ICC”.

57.5. Requirement:

M2M SIM card provisions:

- a. The requirements as specified in the Standard Operating Procedure document issued by DoT for SIM provisioning shall be complied.
- b. GSM connectivity Identifier (MSISDN) for M2M use cases shall be of 13 digits.
- c. The instructions issued by DoT on 16th May 2018 on M2M SIMs / e-SIMs and the related restrictive practices for bulk issuance and Know Your Customer norms shall be complied.

## **Annexure-I (Definitions)**

1. **Attacker:** A hacker, threat agent, threat actor, fraudster, or other malicious threat to an IoT Service. This threat could come from individual criminals, organized crime, terrorism, hostile governments and their agencies, industrial espionage, hacking groups, political activists, ‘hobbyist’ hackers, and researchers, as well as unintentional security and privacy breaches.
2. **Authorized Individuals, services, and other IoT product components:** An entity (i.e., a person, device, service, network, domain, developer, or other party who might interact with an IoT device) that has implicitly or explicitly been granted approval to interact with a particular IoT device.
3. **Best practice cryptography:** Cryptography that is suitable for the corresponding use case and has no indications of a feasible attack with current readily available techniques.
4. **Constrained device:** Device which has physical limitations in either the ability to process data, the ability to communicate data, the ability to store data or the ability to interact with the user, due to restrictions that arise from its intended use.
5. **Consumer:** Natural person who is acting for purposes that are outside her/his trade, business, craft, or profession.
6. **Consumer IoT device:** Network-connected (and network-connectable) device that has relationships to associated services and are used by the consumer typically in the home or as electronic wearables.
7. **Critical security parameter:** Security-related secret information whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a security module.
8. **Defined support period:** Minimum length of time, expressed as a period or by an end-date, for which a manufacturer will provide security updates.
9. **Device manufacturer:** Entity that creates an assembled final consumer IoT product, which is likely to contain the products and components of many other suppliers.
10. **Endpoint:** An IoT Endpoint is a physical computing device that performs a function or task as part of an Internet-connected product or service.
11. **Endpoint Ecosystem:** Any configuration of low-complexity devices, rich devices, and gateways that connect the physical world to the digital world in novel ways.
12. **Factory default:** State of the device after factory reset or after final production/assembly.

13. Forward Secrecy: A property of secure communication protocols: A secure communication protocol is said to have forward secrecy if the compromise of long-term keys does not compromise past session keys.
14. Initialization: Process that activates the network connectivity of the device for operation and optionally sets authentication features for a user or for network access
15. Initialized state: state of the device after initialization.
16. Internet of Things: The Internet of Things describes the coordination of multiple machines, devices, and appliances connected to the Internet through multiple networks. These devices include everyday objects such as tablets and consumer, electronics, and other machines such as vehicles, monitors, and sensors equipped with machine-to-machine (M2M) communications that allow them to send and receive data.
17. IoT SAFE: IoT SIM Applet for Secure End-2-End Communication.
18. IoT Service: Any computer program that leverages data from IoT devices to perform the service.
19. IoT Service Ecosystem: The set of services, platforms, protocols, and other technologies required to provide capabilities and collect data from Endpoints deployed in the field.
20. IoT Service Provider: Enterprises or organizations who are looking to develop new and innovative connected IoT products and services.
21. Logical interface: software implementation that utilizes a network interface to communicate over the network via channels or ports.
22. Manufacturer: relevant economic operator in the supply chain (including the device manufacturer).
23. Network Interface: physical interface that can be used to access the functionality of consumer IoT via a network.
24. Network Operator: The operator and owner of the communication network that connects the IoT Endpoint Device to the IoT Service Ecosystem.
25. Organizational Root of Trust: A set of cryptographic policies and procedures that govern how identities, applications, and communications can and should be cryptographically secured.
26. Owner: User who owns or who purchased the device.
27. Personal data: Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.

28. Personally Identifiable Information (PII): Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual."
29. Public security parameter: Security related public information whose modification can compromise the security of a security module.
30. Physical interface: Physical port or air interface (such as radio, audio or optical) used to communicate with the device at the physical layer.
31. Remotely accessible: Intended to be accessible from outside the local network.
32. Security module: Set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements security functions.
33. Security update: Set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements security functions.
34. Sensitive security parameters: Critical security parameters and public security Parameters.
35. Software service: Software component of a device that is used to support functionality.
36. Subscriber Identity Module: The smart card used by a mobile network to authenticate devices for connection to the mobile network and access to network services.
37. Telemetry: Data from a device that can provide information to help the manufacturer identify issues or information related to device usage.
38. Trust Anchor: In cryptographic systems with a hierarchical structure, a trust anchor is an authoritative entity for which trust is assumed and not derived.
39. Trusted Computing Base: A Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is a conglomeration of algorithms, policies, and secrets within a product or service. The TCB acts as a module that allows the product or service to measure its own trustworthiness, gauge the authenticity of network peers, verify the integrity of messages sent and received to the product or service, and more. The TCB functions as the base security platform upon which security products and services can be built. A TCB's components will change depending on the context (a hardware TCB for Endpoints or a software TCB for cloud services), but the abstract goals, services, procedures, and policies should be very similar.
40. UICC: A Secure Element Platform specified in ETSI TS 102 221 can support multiple standardized network or service authentication applications in cryptographically separated security domains. It may be embodied in embedded form factors specified in ETSI TS 102 671.
41. Unique per device: Unique for each individual device of a given product class or type.

42. User: natural person or organization

43. Video surveillance system [b-ITU-T H.626]: A telecommunication service focusing on video (including audio and image) application technology, which is used to remotely capture multimedia (such as audio, video, image, alarm signal, etc.) and present them to the end user in a user-friendly manner, based on a managed broadband network with ensured quality, security, and reliability.

## Annexure-II (Acronyms)

2FA	-	Two Factor Authentication
3G	-	Third Generation
API	-	Application Program Interface
APN	-	Access Point Name
BLE	-	Bluetooth Low Energy
BT	-	Bluetooth
CLP	-	GSMA's Connected Living Programme
CPU	-	Central Processing Unit
DDoS	-	Distributed Denial of Service
EEPROM	-	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
ENISA	-	European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
ETSI	-	European Telecommunications Standards Institute
GSMA	-	GSM Association
HTTP	-	Hypertext Transfer Protocol.
I/O	-	Input-Output
IoT	-	Internet of Things
IoT SF	-	Internet of Things Security Foundation
IP	-	Internet Protocol
LAN	-	Local-area Network
LoRA	-	Long Range Radio
LPWAN	-	Low-Power Wide-Area Network
LTE-M	-	Long Term Evolution-Machine Type Communication
MFA	-	Multi Factor Authentication

MSISDN	-	Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number
MCU	-	Micro Controller Unit
NB-IoT	-	Narrow Band-Internet of Things
NIST	-	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NFC	-	Near Field Communication
NVRAM	-	Non-Volatile Random Access Memory
OEM	-	Original Equipment Manufacturer
OS	-	Operating System
OWASP	-	Open Web Application Security Project
PC	-	Personal Computer
PII	-	Personally identifiable information
PSK	-	Pre-Shared Key
RAM	-	Random Access Memory
RFID	-	Radio-frequency identification
ROM	-	Read Only Memory
SMS	-	Short Message Service
SSH	-	Secure Shell Protocol
SRAM	-	Static Random Access Memory
TCB	-	Trusted Computing Base
TLS	-	Transport Layer Security
UICC	-	Universal Integrated Circuit Card
Wi-Fi	-	Wireless Fidelity

#### **Annexure-IV (References)**

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**-End of Document-**